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Abstract
We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types,
private information and a competitive supply side. We use the model to in-
vestigate the welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection).
We postulate that a test is available that determines whether an appli-
cant’s risk exceeds a treshold. Excluding the highest risks softens adverse
selection, but constitutes a welfare loss for the high risks. In contrast to
a lemons market intuition, we find that aggregate surplus decreases when
risk aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination
increases aggregate surplus.
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1 Introduction
When purchasing life insurance, insurees are often required to do a medical test,
the result determining at what terms one can be insured, if at all. There is ungoing
debate about insurers’ information use, for example about genetic discrimination
and risk selection (Lemmens 2003). Insurers usually motivate information use by
stating that it is a necessary underwriting strategy, since they suffer from adverse
selection: insurees have private information about their risk profile and base their
decision to buy insurance on this information. Consequently, in a heterogeneous
population only the high-risks will purchase insurance. Even though adverse se-
lection is mitigated by this underwriting, the loss of insurance coverage for the
high-risks forms a welfare loss. We develop a model of adverse selection in which
the two opposing effects are incorporated. Insurers may obtain information about
an applicant’s risk profile by using some screening technology. We postulate that
if the applicant possesses a certain trait (e.g. a gene mutation or virus), his or her
risk profile exceeds some upperbound. The objective is to compare welfare in an
economy where risk profiles above this upperbound are rejected with an economy
in which this is not the case.
We address this question in a setting that has not been studied before. One
of the main novelties of our model is that we use a continuum of risk types. The
advantage of such a realistic setup is that asymmetric information remains after
excluding some of the highest risks. Furthermore, it provides us with a continuous
relation between the demand for insurance and important market variables, such
as risk aversion. The equilibrium we find has more risk types than contracts. This
is not the case in the existing contributions where individuals come in a discrete
number of known risk profiles, usually two. In a two-type model, exluding one
risk type would imply full information about the remaining pool and the welfare
effect of discrimination would be trivial: it would implement the full-information
outcome. Our setting permits the important mechanism that when the highest
risks are excluded, the expected risk in the pool decreases but individual risks
remain unknown. It follows that the actuarially fair premium decreases as well.
This in turn gives rise to the following three effects on aggregate surplus: (i) the
fall in premium paid due to the overall lower risk in the economy, (ii) some low
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risks will switch to purchasing insurance (softening adverse selection) and (iii)
loss of insurance for the high risk types. Our analysis fully balances these three
effects and thus shows when total welfare improves due to discrimination and
when this is not the case. We thereby contribute to the debate on the desirability
of information usage by insurers.
Since discrimination is a mechanism that potentially softens adverse selection,
we want to look at adverse selection in isolation from other solutions, like offering
an incentive compatible menu-of-contracts where different types choose different
combinations of premium and deductible. Additionally, we want to portray a
market where there are more risk types than contracts as clearly as possible, and
therefore we assume that insurers compete only on the price dimension.
Our results are as follows. The loss of insurance effect (iii) depends on the
treshold, which in turn is determined by the nature of the peculiarity tested for
and the test technology. For a given treshold, the total effect on welfare depends
therefore on the magnitude of effect (i) and (ii) mentioned above. How large
will the premium decrease be and how many low risks will be persuaded to buy
insurance as a result? The answer depends on the risk attitude in the population.
It turns out that when risk aversion is low, the price elasticity of the demarcating
low risk consumer is high and many low-risks are gained. As a result, total welfare
increases in that case. When risk aversion is very low, a market does not emerge if
insurers do not discriminate, while it always emerges in the discrimination regime.
On the contrary, when risk aversion is high, even the low risks already have a
relatively high willingness to purchase insurance and not many are gained by a
premium decrease. Hence, the welfare effect of discrimination is negative in that
case.
It is interesting to compare our result with a lemons market model, initiated
by Akerlof (1970). In our model, the volume of transactions decreases as a result
of discrimination, when risk aversion is high. However, in the lemons model an
increase in the lowerbound of the quality distribution always increases the volume
of transactions.1
1Suppose that quality is distributed uniformly on [θ, θ] and that buyers are willing to pay
v.E (θ) and that a seller is willing to trade only if the price exceeds his/her quality. Then it
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The literature on adverse selection (in insurance) provides the background for
the motivation of this paper.2 There is quite some literature on discrimination
and risk selection. Lemmens (2003) gives an overview of policy and legal issues of
genetic discrimination in Canada. The relevance of risk selection in its many forms
is discussed by Eggleston (2000), it is furthermore suggested that both demand-
side cost sharing and risk selection are ways to discourage over-utilization in health
insurance. The optimal combination of the two is being analyzed.
A concern raised by insurers is the discrepancy between premium paid and ex-
pected costs, while on the contrary others stress the role of solidarity in insurance:
low risks should pay more than their expected costs to subsidize the high risks.
According to the first concern, a better identification of risk type can be seen as
a reduction of discrimination since the discrepancy between premium paid and
expected costs decreases. Hoy and Lambert (2000) analyze this effect for genetic
screening and assert that the possibility of misclassification is a counterforce.
In contrast to the above papers, we focus on the simple question whether risk
selection increases welfare. Our contribution captures the effect that by excluding
some risks, the price for the remaining pool decreases, softening adverse selection.
We provide clear-cut conclusions about aggregate surplus.
A related common underwriting strategy is risk classification. The difference
with risk selection is that with classification, all risk categories are being offered
a contract, whereas with selection the highest risks are simply rejected. We use
simulations in which the rejected individuals are offered a risk adjusted alternative.
This addition does not change our results.
Crocker and Snow developed a theory of risk classification and review it in
Crocker and Snow (2000). No sophisticated tests are used but simple data such
as age, gender and domicile. Instead, we allow for insurers to gather information
by some costly technology, that is potentially more informative, e.g. genetics.
They allow for screening of individuals by menus of contracts that have to be
made incentive compatible. In contrast, by precluding screening we isolate the
can be shown that in equilibrium the sellers in
[
θ, v2−vθ
]
trade and the volume of transactions
equals 2v−12−vθ and is thus increasing in the lowerbound of quality θ.
2This literature was initiated by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and is surveyed in Dionne et
al. (2000). For empirical evidence on adverse selection, see Puelz and Snow (1994).
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merits of risk classification from such other mechanisms that partly resolve adverse
selection. Related to this, our simple modelling setup relates clear-cut welfare
implications to the degree of risk aversion, as opposed to their conclusions that
are more ambiguous. This is due to the complexity of their separating equilibrium
and maximization problems, furthermore they need to implement complicated
transfers to attain a welfare improvement.
Insurers may also employ some information technology ex-post to investigate
the information that was provided by the insuree himself in the insurance ap-
plication. Insurance law allows for contestability, i.e. when a claim is filed and
falsehood is proven, the contract may become void and the payment of indemnity
can be denied. This issue is analyzed in Dixit and Picard (2002) and Van der Noll
(2005).
Finally, an issue quite different from risk selection occurs when symmetric
information is the starting point and an increase of information available to the
insuree may create adverse selection. In Subramanian et al. (1999) consumers
may learn more about their own risk by doing a genetic test. Using mortality
rates for a known gene mutation, they discuss the consequence of this private
information for the expected costs of the insurer.
Section 2 presents the model, followed by Sections 3 on equilibrium and 4 on
welfare. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an insurance market, where the demand side consists of a continuum of
individuals who seek to insure the amount of R. Individuals have private informa-
tion about their probability of loss ai and are strictly risk averse, with constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA). We assume that v (m) = − exp (−cm) represents
the utility of income, where c > 0 denotes the CARA coefficient. If no damage
occurs, wealth equals y1 and in case of damage it equals y2, where y1 − y2 ≥ R.
The supply side has many insurance firms competing by setting a price P .
Insurance companies are risk-neutral, have no administration costs and know that
the distribution of ai is uniform with support [0, 1]. In our main result we will
assume full insurance: y1 − y2 = R.
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Consider the contract P, for individual i the expected utility if this contract
is purchased equals:
aiv (y2 +R− P ) + (1− ai) v (y1 − P ) , (1)
and if no insurance is purchased, expected utility equals:
aiv (y2) + (1− ai) v (y) . (2)
Let:
D1 (P ) = v (y1)− v (y1 − P ) ;
D2 (P ) = v (y2 +R− P )− v (y2) .
Expression D1 denotes the ex-post utility cost of insurance if no accident occurred
and D2 denotes the ex-post utility gain of insurance in case an accident occurred.
From (1) and (2), we can derive that, for type i, the utility of taking the contract
in excess of the utility of not taking the contract equals:
aiD2 (P )− (1− ai)D1 (P ) .
This expression is intuitive: if an accident occurs (with probability ai), the util-
ity gain D2 is enjoyed, otherwise the cost D1 is incurred. We can rewrite the
expression as:
F (ai, P ) = (D1 (P ) +D2 (P )) ai −D1 (P ) .
An individual purchases the contract iff F > 0. Since F is increasing in ai, F (0) <
0 and F (1) > 0 it follows that there exists aˆ such that an individual purchases
insurance iff. ai > aˆ, where
aˆ = D1 (P )D1 (P ) +D2 (P,R) .
We now introduce the information technology that allows insurers to exclude
the highest risks. We assume that a technology is available that allows an insurer
to determine whether an individual has a certain trait that is informative about
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the risk profile (e.g. have a disease or gene mutation). Individuals that are found
not to possess this trait are known to have a risk profile that does not exceed
a certain treshold, denoted by ah < 1.3 Yet, their precise risk profile remains
unknown beyond that knowledge. We assert that ah depends on the characteristic
that is being tested for and on the accuracy of the test.
From the analysis above it follows that the selection of types that demands
insurance is then [aˆ, ah] and the expected risk of an insuree equals E (ai) = aˆ+ah2 .
The benchmark case of no discrimination corresponds to ah = 1. In what follows,
we first characterize equilibrium and consequently investigate the welfare effects of
discrimination, i.e. a regime in which ah is less than but close to 1. Total welfare
is defined as the sum of all actors’ utilities.
3 Equilibrium
Due to perfect competition on the side of insurers, we require that, in expectation,
they break even on the contract P :
P − E (ai) .R = 0 or
f (P ) ≡ 2PR −
D1 (P )
D1 (P ) +D2 (P ) = a
h. (3)
Observe that for a market to exist, we must have that in equilibrium, aˆ < ah. The
following defines an insurance market in equilibrium:
Definition Let the discrimination treshold be ah ∈ (0, 1]. The premium P ∗
characterizes an insurance market in equilibrium if (i) f (P ∗) = ah and (ii) P ∗ <
R. Consumers in [aˆ, ah] purchase insurance. If no such P ∗ exists, no market
emerges.
To verify that this is an equilibrium, note that any firm that deviates by setting
a lower premium will make a loss because of (3) and that any firm that sets a
higher premium attracts no customers. The optimality of the consumer decision
is derived above.
3Insurers may have learned this through past experience.
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We now provide a claim about f (P ) , that is useful to characterize the equi-
librium and to show it is unique. In the Appendix we show that:
Claim 1 f (0) = 0, f (R) = 1; dfdP (0) > 0 and d2fdP2 < 0.
The above claim implies that equilibrium is unique: f is concave and if it has
two intersections with ah then one is in the point where P = R which cannot be
an equilibrium. Note that these claims hold for any concave utility function.
Lemma 2 For any concave utility of income, the insurance market equilibrium is
unique. If ah < 1, a market always emerges.
The claim indicates that the premium increases in the upperbound ah. Now
since the lowerbound of participating types aˆ increases in P (which can easily be
inferred from the proof of Claim 1), it follows that lowering ah has two opposing
effects on market volume. The first is simply that individuals on the upper end
of the distribution will be excluded. The second is that more individuals on the
lower end of the risk distribution will demand insurance, because the premium
decreases. This effect increases market volume and thus softens adverse selection.
This will show to be of importance when assessing the welfare effects.
4 Welfare Analysis
The following two results will show to be convenient:
Claim 3 f (P ) increases in c.
Claim 4 We have limc→0 aˆ = P/R and limc→∞ aˆ = 0.
Claim 3 implies that P ∗ decreases in c. The more risk averse people are, the
more they are willing to pay for insurance, yet the equilibrium premium decreases.
This is because aˆ decreases in c (more low risks will buy insurance), and the
expected risk profile decreases in c and due to the zero profit condition, this
decreases the premium.
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We now continue by investigating the welfare that obtains in this market.
Since firms make zero expected profits in equilibrium, we add the utility of all
types. Formally:∫ 1
0
[aiv (y2) + (1− ai)v (y1)] dai +
∫ ah
aˆ
F (ai, P ) dai.
Note that the density function of ai equals 1 and is omitted. Also, the first integral
is independent of endogeneous variables and since F is lineair in ai it is easy to see
that it equals v(y1)−v(y2)2 . This part of welfare obtains independent of the market.
The second integral can be attributed to the operation of a market for insurance
and we denote it by W. It can be written as:
W = 1/2((D1 +D2) (ah)2 + (D1)2D1 +D2 − 2D1ah).
When ah = 1 we have W = 12 [D2]
2
D1+D2 . Importantly, note that this part of welfare
is only realized when a market emerges. The next proposition characterizes the
effect of discrimination, i.e. decreasing ah marginally, on welfare. The case where
R is smaller than y1 − y2 as well as a wider variation of ah will be provided by
numerical simulations below.
Proposition 5 Let y1 − y2 = R. There exists c1 and c2, 0 < c1 ≤ c2, such that
the effect of a marginal decrease of ah is as follows: (i) if c < c1 then welfare (W )
increases and (ii) if c > c2, then welfare decreases.
The result weighs the three effects that were mentioned in the introduction
and can be explained by looking at market volume. When risk aversion is low
(c < c1), the demand for insurance by low risks is relatively low (high lowerbound
aˆ) and their price elasticity is relatively high. The premium decrease due to a
lower ah then induces a large decrease in aˆ, and hence, a large increase in the
market volume.
When risk aversion is high however (c > c2), the low risks are already more
inclined to buy insurance (low lowerbound aˆ) and a premium decrease does not
induce a large decrease of aˆ and thus, the market volume and welfare decrease
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due to lower ah. The important mechanism at work is thus the price sensitivity
of the pivot aˆ which, in turn, is determined by the risk attitude c.
Above we assumed that the excluded risks are lost for this economy. It has
been shown that this is plausible in real-world insurance, for example by Eggleston
(2000). However, it is also observed in some markets that the high risks are offered
an alternative insurance policy (known as risk classification). By using numerical
simulation, we next analyze if the above welfare result continues to hold if the
excluded risk types are being offered a competitive alternative, geared to their
risk profile. The risk types that get this contract are in [ah, 1] and the premium
that breaks even for this contract is P = Rah+12 .4 The welfare generated by this
contract is:
W h =
∫ 1
ah
F
(
ai, Ra
h + 1
2
)
dai,
note that since F (ah, ·) > 0, the area under F is a square plus a triangle, therefore:
W h = 12
(1− ah) [(v (y1)− v (y2)) ah + 2v (y1 − P )− v (y2)− v (y1)],
where P = Rah+12 . We computedW +W h in Table 1.5 The Table shows that the
result continues to hold when high-risks get a contract, there is 20% coinsurance
(R is smaller than y1−y2) and the decrease in ah is more than marginal. It nicely
illustrates Proposition 5: when the CARA coefficient c is 3.5 or higher, excluding
some of the highest risks decreases welfare. However, when risk aversion is lower
than 3.5, welfare is maximized for ah < 1 : the welfare loss for high risks that
results from discrimination is in that case more than offset by the welfare gain of
the intermediate risks. When c < 2 a market doesn’t emerge at all if insurers do
not discriminate, and in that case welfare is maximized when the 80% lowest and
20% highest risks obtain separate contracts. Of course, the level of ah that can
be set in the market depends on screening technologies and the underlying risk
determinants.
4It can be shown that there is no adverse selection of the consumers [ah, 1] : all types purchase
the contract, formally it must be that F
(
ah, Rah+12
)
≥ 0.
5The algorithms are available upon request.
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:c  
=
ha 0,8 =ha 0,85 =ha 0,9 =ha 0,95 =ha 1 
0,001 0,00000001 0,00000001 0,00000000 0,00000000 0,00000000 
0,5 0,00354953 0,00226201 0,00114772 0,00033047 0,00000000 
1 0,02013119 0,01479152 0,00903650 0,00337247 0,00000000 
1,5 0,05354369 0,04526396 0,03448210 0,01983445 0,00000000 
2 0,09500343 0,08807487 0,07815561 0,06254627 0,03148265 
2,5 0,13312970 0,12974048 0,12454256 0,11554422 0,09754395 
3 0,16262105 0,16264971 0,16233828 0,16057401 0,15483261 
3,5 0,18300086 0,18551296 0,18891018 0,19271931 0,19580298 
4 0,19571150 0,19974196 0,20556658 0,21315842 0,22217796 
4,5 0,20255250 0,20733971 0,21455982 0,22450944 0,23736602 
5 0,20511071 0,21011745 0,21798604 0,22925902 0,24448385 
5,5 0,20462931 0,20950261 0,21750835 0,22938325 0,24596011 
6 0,20203231 0,20655539 0,21436285 0,22634866 0,24357739 
6,5 0,19798910 0,20204082 0,20944004 0,22120994 0,23860989 
7 0,19297856 0,19650271 0,20337115 0,21471377 0,23195704 
7,5 0,18734128 0,19032454 0,19659956 0,20738414 0,22424970 
8 0,18131897 0,18377544 0,18943484 0,19958666 0,21592868 
 
Figure 1: W +W h for y1 = 1.1, y2 = .1, R = 0.8 and different values of c and ah.
5 Concluding remarks
By setting up a model of adverse selection with a continuum of risk types, we
assessed the welfare effects (in terms of aggregate surplus) of risk selection (or
discrimination) in insurance. The use of the continuum made the problem non-
trivial: after selecting some risks out, uncertainty about individuals’ risk remains.
It also highlights the role of risk aversion in explaining the demand for insurance.
Insurers compete on the price dimension only, allowing us to obtain an equilibrium
with more risk types than contracts.
Our results contribute to the debate on the desirability of information use by
insurers. Only when risk aversion is low, discrimination can be justified on the
basis of aggregate surplus. In fact, in this case it might prevent the market from
not emerging at all.
Appendix
In the Appendix we denote by L the loss y1 − y2.
Claim 1 f (0) = 0, f (R) = 1; dfdP (0) > 0 and d2fdP 2< 0 .
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Proof. The first two observations are trivially verified. The derivative equals:
df
dP =
2
R −
D′1 (P )D2 −D1D′2 (P )
[D1 +D2]2 ,
and the derivative in 0 is
df
dP (0) =
2
R −
D′1 (P )
D2 (P ) =
2
R −
v′ (y1)
v (y2 +R)− v (y2) .
For the latter to be positive it has to be required that:
2 > v
′ (y1)
v(y2+R)−v(y2)
R
.
Now note that the denominator is simply the slope of the secant line through y2
and y2 + R and that y2 + R is at most y1. From the concavity of v (·) it then
follows that v′ (y1) < v(y2+R)−v(y2)R and this proves the third observation.
Next, note that:
d2f (P )
dP 2 = −
[D′′1 (P )D2 −D1D′′2 (P )
[D1 +D2]2 −
2 [D′1 (P )D2 −D1D′2 (P )] [D′1 (P ) +D′2 (P )]
[D1 +D2]3
]
.
Now since D1 > 0, D2 > 0, D′1 > 0, D′2 < 0, D′′1 > 0 and D′′2 < 0 and the fact
that D′1 (P ) +D′2 (P ) < 0, this derivative is negative.
Claim 3 Let v (m) = − exp (−cm) . f (P ) increases in c.
Proof. We have to show that aˆ decreases in c. Recall that
aˆ = D1 (P )D1 (P ) +D2 (P )
and let D′ic = ∂Di∂c for i = 1, 2. Then we can write:
∂aˆ
∂c =
D′1cD2 −D′2cD1
[D1 +D2]2 ,
and for the latter expression to be negative, we require that:
D′1c
D1 <
D′2c
D2 .
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For the specified utility function, this becomes:
− (y1 − P ) exp (−c (y1 − P )) + y1 exp (−cy1)
exp (−c (y1 − P ))− exp (−cy1) <
−y2 exp (−cy2) + (y2 +R− P ) exp (−c (y2 +R− P ))
exp (−cy2)− exp (−c (y2 +R− P )) ,
which is equivalent to:
− (y1 − P ) exp (cP ) + y1
exp (cP )− 1 <
(y2 +R− P ) exp (−c [R− P ])− y2
1− exp (−c [R− P ]) ⇔
− P exp (cP )1− exp (cP ) −
(R− P ) exp (−c [R− P ])
1− exp (−c [R− P ]) < y1 − y2.
Now let x1 = −P, x2 = R−P, and bring the exponential terms to the denominator,
then we can rewrite the above expression as:
x1
exp (cx1)− 1 −
x2
exp (cx2)− 1 < L. (4)
Now we will show that (i): xexp(cx)−1 decreases in x and (ii): check inequality (4)
for x1 = −L and x2 = R:
(i): The derivative equals exp(cx)(1−cx)−1[exp(cx)−1]2 and we can demonstrate that ex (1− x) <
1 for x > 0 : in x = 0, LHS=RHS and dLHSdx = −xex < 0.
(ii) We have −Lexp(−cL)−1 − Rexp(cR)−1 < L, which is equivalent to − Rexp(cR)−1 <
L exp(−cL)exp(−cL)−1 , which, in turn, is equivalent to Rexp(cR)−1 > Lexp(cL)−1 .Now since R ≤ L,
and xexp(cx)−1 decreases in x (shown in (i) above) the inequality holds for all R < L.
When R = L, LHS equals RHS.
Due to step (i), it is enough to find for some x1 < −P and x2 > R−P a weak
inequality of (4). This is done in step (ii).
Claim 4 We have (a) limc→0 aˆ = P/R and (b) limc→∞ aˆ = 0.
Proof. (a) Write aˆ as 1/y (c) , where y (c) = 1+D2/D1. By applying the rule
of l’Hopital once we obtain that D2/D1 → (R− P ) /P and hence y (c)→ R/P.
(b) From Claim 3 we know that aˆ decreases in c, therefore it converges. Sup-
pose for sake of contradiction that it converges to a strictly positive number,
lim aˆ > 0. This implies that there exists small  > 0 such that limc→∞ F (, P ) < 0
(a low risk type does not buy insurance when c → ∞). Now since F (0, P ) =
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−D1 (P ) and D1 (P )→ 0 this is contradicted and the result follows.
Proposition 5 Let R = L. There exists c1 and c2, 0 < c1 ≤ c2, such that the
effect of a marginal decrease of ah is as follows: (i) if c < c1 then welfare (W )
increases and (ii) if c > c2, then welfare decreases.
Proof. (i)
We know that when ah = 1, a market emerges iff
2 < v
′ (y2)
v(y1)−v(y1−R)
R
, (5)
while a market always emerges when ah < 1. Hence, when the above inequality
is violated, a marginal decrease of ah means that in stead of foreclose, a market
emerges, which is a welfare improvement. We will now show that a violation of
(5) is equivalent to a low value of c. When R = L, (5) reads as cL1−exp(−cL) > 2
and LHS increases in cL. To complete the proof of the statement, note that
limc→0 cL1−exp(−cL) = 1.
(ii)
Recall that P is a function of ah via (3). WhenR = L we have thatD1+D2 is inde-
pendent of endogeneous variables. We have thatW = 12
{
(D1 +D2) (ah)2 + (D1)2D1+D2 − 2D1ah}
and taking the derivative w.r.t. ah we obtain:
∂2W
∂ah = (D1 +D2) 2a
h + 1(D1 +D2)2D1
∂D1
∂P
∂P
∂ah − 2
(∂D1
∂P
∂P
∂ah +D1
)
,
now substitute ah = 1, the expressions for D1 and D2 and rearrange:
[v (y − L)− v (y − P )]
{ v′ (y − P )
v (y)− v (y − L)
∂P
∂ah − 1
}
,
with the specific utility function this becomes:
[exp (−c (y − P ))− exp (−c (y − L))]
( c
exp (c (L− P ))− exp (−cP )
∂P
∂ah − 1
)
We will now show that the latter equality is positive for c large enough. Ob-
serve that the first multiplicand is negative. Now recall that when c→∞, â→ 0
and hence ∂P∂ah → R2 in that case. We will next investigate the fraction between
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brackets cexp(c(L−P ))−exp(−cP ) .
We have that the derivative has the sign of [1− c (L− P )] exp (c (L− P )) −
(1 + cP ) exp (−cP ) and is therefore negative when:
1− cL1 + cP < exp (−cL) .
Now note that the fraction on the LHS increases in c, implying that LHS becomes
eventually negative. This demonstrates that the derivative is negative for c large
enough. We will now show that
limc→∞ cexp(c(L−P ))−exp(−cP ) = 0. Applying the rule of l’Hopital once we obtain that
the limit equals limc→∞ 1(L−P ) exp(c(L−P ))+P exp(−cP ) = 0. Therefore, the fraction
between brackets decreases in c for c large enough and converges to zero and
since ∂P∂ah → R2 their product becomes less than 1 for c large enough. The above
demonstrates that ∂W/∂ah > 0 for such c and completes the proof.
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